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Abstract: The study examines the impact of country risk (financial, political and economic risk) and shocks on investment at 
firm level. Corporate financing theory proponents, assuming perfect markets, argues that investment policy of a firm should 
depend solely on its earnings generation power focusing mainly on the effects of firm specific factors ignoring the role of 
country risk factors. Building on the firm investment behaviour theory the role of country risk factors in determining firm 
investment is analysed. This study employed a dynamic panel model estimated with the Generalised Methods of Moments 
estimation methodology to analyse a panel of 294 non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Results 
establish that high risk score (low risk) is positively associated with investment. Shocks in risk ratings were also found to be 
negatively associated with investment at firm level. Regarding risk shocks, the result suggests that not only the level of risk 
matters but, risk changes also affect firm investment levels. These findings imply that country risk levels constrain firm 
investment as firms lower their investment levels following an increase in country risk. This study contributes to debate on 
the topic by identifying the specific risk components that are more detrimental to firm investment as opposed to investment 
analysis at aggregate level from previous studies. 
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1. Introduction  
A substantial theoretical and empirical literature on the drivers of firm investment in different 
economies has appeared over the years but never sufficient. The world system is becoming more 
dynamic, firms engage in many practices to evolve with economic and technological advancement 
(Dale*, 2005). As such the factors that influence the behaviour of firms evolve with the advancement 
of the global system. Modigliani and Miller (1958) traditionally argued that in an efficient market the 
investment policy of a firm should depend solely on its ability to generate earnings and cash flows. In 
real world market imperfections and information asymmetry are inevitable. As such considerable 
advances in theory and measurement have been made. Asymmetric information, market imperfections 
and financial market dynamics from globalisation have opened Pandora’s Box in the evolution of 
financial theory (Vilasuso & Minkler, 2001). Financial theory reveal that shareholders, bondholders 
and managers interactions generate frictions which induce underinvestment and overinvestment 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
Globalisation and democratisation trend have exposed developing countries to greater scrutiny and 
accountability (economically, financially, socially and politically) from a broader global perspective. 
The global financial crisis fuelled the need for investments in growing markets, with Africa among the 
economies offering higher returns on foreign investments (Goetzmann & Kumar, 2008). Increased 
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international investment and diversification has exposed firms to different risk exposures and 
accelerated the assessment of economies to different risks (Hayakawa, Kimura, & Lee, 2013). 
According to the International monetary fund (IMF.org, 2018) South Africa is rated among the most 
promising emerging markets which offers an exclusive blend of highly industrialized economic 
infrastructure and a vivacious emerging market-economy. South Africa is endowed with innovative 
financial services infrastructure with the JSE being among the world’s top 20 exchanges, a well-
diversified economy, progressive constitution and independent judiciary, favourable access to Global 
markets and a location of choice for Multinational companies (UNCTAD, 2018). However, there is a 
notable decline in private sector investment since the 2008 financial crisis. The dearth of the private 
sector investment has been pointed as one of the reflectors of South African economic stagnation in 
the last ten years (Nicolai & Vincent, 2018). The private sector investment, as by  2018, was around 
20percent lower than the pre 2008 Global financial crisis period. Nicolai and Vincent (2018) states 
that the private sector was on an “investment strike” due to political and economic uncertainty.  
Globalization broadened international operations coupled with an exposure to respective country risk 
in the host economies. Country risk can be broadly classified into financial, economic and political 
risk.  Considering risk factors in South Africa, the political and economic uncertainty eroded business 
& consumer confidence lowing private sector investment (WorldBank, Dept, & Group, 2018).  
Volatility of the rand of up to 8.6 percent between 20017 and 2018, an increase in inflation to the 
upper bound of the -6 percent target 3 lowered the growth of the economy averaging 1 percent in 2017 
and 2018 and increased economic risk rating (IMF.org, 2018). High levels of crime, civil unrest and 
lack of precision on policy and structural reforms hampered investor potential and these challenges 
have affected investment levels over the years. As such there is a dynamic progression on country risk 
adjustment. The developments in country risks pauses questions on the role of these risks on 
investment stagnation. Previous studies on country risk and firm investment across the world including 
Hayakawa et al. (2013), Kazunobu, Fukunari, and Hyun-Hoon (2011), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen 
(2007) and Panaretou (2014) examined the effect of risk components on real investment at aggregate 
level. Studies that focused on firm investment have not considered the role of country risk at firm 
level.  The role of dynamics and shocks in country risk on firm level investment remains unanswered 
and more specifically the relationship between investment and political, economic and financial 
components of country risks at firm level has not been investigated. This study closes this gap by 
investigating how the shocks in country risk components on firm investment in the South African 
context. In a way the study contributes to debate on this topic by identifying which risk components 
that are more detrimental to firm investment.  
 
2. Literature  
From the theoretical perspective, the behavioural theory posits that risk averse managers will avoid 
investing in countries with high political risk (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). The traditional economic 
theory posits that managers are homogeneous and characteristically may act in the best interest of 
shareholders (Slovic, 1987). On the other end, the behaviourists argues that how executives manages 
their firms is dependent of individual manager’s characteristics (Gervais, Heaton, & Odean, 2011; 
Palomino & Sadrieh, 2011). Form the traditional economic theory perspective investment will be 
homogeneous, managers make investment decisions based on shareholder risk appetite. However, the 
behavioural approach implies that investment decisions for a given risk level will vary across firms 
depending on management behaviour, characteristic, phycological biases and risk tolerance. In this 
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context, the behavioural theories predict low investment in risky countries for firms with risk averse 
executives with low personal risk profiles.  
The Agency theory predicts that firms with risk averse managers invest less in economies with high 
country risk if there is less inclination to shareholder interests (Kazunobu et al., 2011). The degree of 
misalignment between shareholder interests and managers exacerbates the extent to which the firm 
executives will make decision in their own interests at the expense of shareholders. R. M. Stulz 
(1984), and Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that in situations when the agency conflicts are particularly 
acute, there is a higher degree to which high risk averse managers will implement risk management in 
accordance with their personal tolerance to risk. Gormley and Matsa (2016) in investigating 
managerial preferences, risk and agency conflicts found evidence that young managers due to agency 
driven concern  “play it safe” by making risk reducing investments. Thus, such firms will avoid 
economies, sectors or assets with higher risk. On the other hand, firms with high risk-taking managers 
will invest more in economies, sectors or assets with high risk in search of higher returns (Bali & 
Cakici, 2010).  
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) under the assumptions of perfect market and rational investors 
argues that markets are efficient and a true reflection of all the available information. In such a market 
investors cannot persistently and predictable beat the market in any investment analysis, hence, the 
only way investors can profit is through investment is risky assets (Malkiel, 1989). From this 
argument, the EMH thus predicts high investment levels for risky environments or asset classes as the 
only way that yields higher returns (Cermeño & Suleman, 2014). Thus, higher country risk must be 
associated with high levels of investment, however, in practice there is investment stagnation in such 
countries. At aggregate level, Kazunobu et al. (2011) empirically investigated the impact of financial 
risk and political risk on foreign direct investment (FDI) and concluded that higher political risk 
lowers FDI, financial risk was found to be uncorrelated with FDI. This finding was supported by 
Hayakawa et al. (2013), who found political risk to negatively impact FDI in a sample of developing 
economies. Additionally, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2017) document that almost 50 percent of 
firms avoids FDI as a result of high political risk in the target countries. Busse and Hefeker (2007) and 
Ali, Fiess, and MacDonald (2010) documents political stability as a major determinant of investment. 
Bevan and Estrin (2004) in analysing the determinants of FDI in European transition economies 
highlights that economic risk plays an important role in attracting investment.  
The majority of these studies analysed the impact of political and financial risk on FDI and aggregate 
variables. However, FDI on aggregate variables may not capture firm specific investment hence the 
need for a study at the disaggregated level. The present study contributes to literature through 
examining the effects of the country risk components on investment at firm level.  
 
3. Methodology  
Data and Variables  
The study considered 401 firms listed on the JSE for a 23-year period (1995 to 2018). Listed firms 
were selected specifically for the availability of reliable public financial data. Firm level annual data 
was obtained from financial statements through the Bloomberg L.P (2019) online financial database. 
Firms with reported financial data of at least 4 years were kept in the sample this is line with the 
estimation technique, which requires at least three observation to allow instrumentation and 
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differencing process. The study employed an unbalanced panel data, after screening and checking for 
missing variables and coding errors, 294 firms were left for estimation. The benefits of panel data 
includes the ability of reducing co-linearity of explanatory variables, allows observation of multiple 
phenomena over multiple time periods improving econometric estimates efficiency (Akhtar & Oliver, 
2009)  
Firm level investment was measured as relative investment defined as the sum of investment (capital 
expenditures) per one unit of fixed assets and this is consistent with (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005; 
Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996). Four different risk indices of country risk namely financial risk, political 
risk, economic risk and composite index were used for analysis. The paper employed country risk data 
developed by the ICRG. Bekaert and Hoerova (2014), Hoti, McAleer, and Shareef (2005), Howell 
Llewellyn (2013) show that ICRG data measures and predicts risk better than other risk providers.  
Political risk measure offers an assessment of the country’s political stability (Howell Llewellyn, 
2013). To assess political environment, the ICRG methodology uses twelve risk components 
including, law& order, government stability, socio economic conditions, corruption, eternal conflict, 
military in politics, ethnic tension, internal and external conflict, investment profile, bureaucracy 
quality and democratic accountability (Howell, 2011). Economic risk evaluates economic strength and 
weaknesses through economic risk components ( GDP per capita, inflation, budget balance and GDP 
growth) (Howell Llewellyn, 2013). Countries with low economic risk economic strength outweighs 
weaknesses and a higher economic risk results from economic weaknesses that outweighs strengths 
(Suleman & Randal, 2016). Financial risk measures the ability of a nation to service its official debt 
obligations and commercial trade. The financial risk index is assessed through international liquidity, 
exchange rate stability, and foreign debt as a percentage of GDP (Howell, 2011). The composite 
index, which measures the overall country risk, is the weighted average of political, financial and 
economic risk indices. The higher the risk point the lower the risk (Howell, 2011). Following previous 
studies (Aivazian et al. (2005); Vengesai and Kwenda (2018); Muñoz (2013); Yuan and Motohashi 
(2014), standard variables which influence firm investment intensity were used as explanatory 
variables. Cash flows were used to control for financial constraints measured as a ratio of cash from 
operations to net fixed assets, Tobin’s Q (market to book value of assets ratio) as a proxy for growth 
opportunities, sales scaled by net fixed assets used to control for size and the ratio of debt to total 
assets to capture financial leverage.   
 
4. Model Specification  
The Lang et al. (1996) standard reduced form investment model was extended to a dynamic panel 
model since panel data is under consideration. Investment trends are dynamic, firms thrive to 
smoothen their investment patterns overtime as such previous investment behaviour influences current 
patterns. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable helps to measure the influence of past 
investment on current investment levels and reduces auto correlation arising from any misspecification 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991).  Through the estimation technique, a dynamic panel model helps in 
controlling for possible endogeneity and heterogeneity problems in the sample data.  The dynamic 
model captures investment dynamics over time and allows partial adjustment mechanism modelling  
(Baum, Barkoulas, & Caglayan, 2001) 
The general dynamic model which captures individual effects is given as;  
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Where  is a fixed effect, is the lagged dependent variable,  is explanatory variables vector 
with j factors (j=1..., 4).  random disturbance and assuming  
Extending from equation one specific dynamic models estimated are specified as:  
 
Where;  are exogenous variables for the risk measures (financial; economic, political or composite 
index),  is the change in risk. re parameters of the country risk components to be 
estimated  Respectively, leverage, cash flows and Tobin’s Q for firm i at time 
t.  are parameters to be estimated.  is time invariant unobservable specific effects and 
 is the error term. 
4.1 Model Estimation  
Measurement errors, omitted variables, likelihood of Tobin’s Q being an endogenous variable and 
possible bi-directional causation between investment and leverage can give rise to endogeneity 
problems and correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term (Muñoz, 2013). The 
presence of the lagged dependent variable, in model two, introduces autocorrelation due to the 
correlation of   and    and dynamic bias that cannot be controlled 
by traditional estimation techniques (OLS, Fixed & Random effects) (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 
2008).  In such conditions, there is need to introduce stochastic variation into the model. The System 
GMM attests to it being the suitable estimation technique in the presence of serial correlation from 
idiosyncratic disturbances, endogenous explanatory variables and heteroscedasticity (Roodman, 2006).  
The system GMM instruments differenced equations with levels instruments and instruments levels 
equations with first differenced instruments generating a system of equations. The lagged and levels 
endogenous  instruments make endogenous variables predetermined and reduce auto correlation with 
the error term (Blundell & Bond, 1998). The second equation generated from the system of equations 
provides additional instruments of the lagged first differenced variable (  ) increasing efficiency 
(Roodman, 2006).  
Through first differencing equation two is transformed to;  
 
The fixed effect   does not vary over time and by differencing the regressors it is removed. 
Autocorrelation arising from the presence of the dynamic term   is controlled by instrumentation 
with differenced and levels instruments. The orthogonal conditions in the variance-covariance 
utilization  capacitates control for simultaneity, heteroscedasticity, correlation of errors and address 
endogeneity problem (Antoniou et al., 2008). The models were estimated with the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) two-step system GMM.  
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5. Empirical Results  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for firm investment and country risk components of JSE listed 
firms. The descriptive statistics show low investment levels for JSE listed firms, capex as a ratio of net 
fixed assets averages 0.2569. Low investment rates are a cause for concern for the growth of the 
economy. The standard deviation of investment (0.2029) is almost equal to the mean indicating high 
variability of investment levels, implying lack of investment consistency in JSE listed firms. 
Regarding country risk components, economic and financial risks have higher lower average rating 
35.22 (0.7) & 37.77 (0.76%) compared to political risk 67.37 (0.67). A lower rating indicates a higher 
potential risk, thus there is higher political risk in South Africa compared to economic and financial 
risks.  
Table 1 further shows that political risk is more variable as shown by a higher standard deviation 
(3.48) compared to financial and economic risks with 1.2 and 1.7. A higher standard deviation 
indicates more volatility in political risk environment. The analyses of the statistics show that the 
leverage levels of South African listed firms are low as shown by lower mean value. The average 
Tobin’s Q ratio of 1.5 on average indicates a higher expectations of strong growth opportunities for 
JSE listed firms, implying that South African firms on average can be classified as high growth firms. 
The descriptive statistics show high variability of cash flows as shown by a higher standard deviation 
(3.77) relative to the mean (1.06). This can be explained by volatile business cycles and economic 
conditions and uncertainty.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INV Investment  3,291 0.2569 0.2029 0 1.26 
FR Financial risk 5,662 37.7668 1.1932 35.67 39.83 
PR Political risk 5,662 67.3765 3.4758 62.67 74.08 
ER Economic risk 5,662 35.21699  1.7458 32.51  38.04 
CR Composite index  5,662 49.5959 7.1752 31.33 56.04 
FRC Financial risk change 5,662 -0.2603 1.1127 -2.04 2.04 
ERC Economic risk change  5,662 0.1429 1.1853 -2.13 3.87 
PRC Political risk change 5,662 -0.3942 2.4984 -5.34 6.12 
CRC Composite risk change  5,662 -1.0122 3.9794 -18.22 3.61 
CFN Cash flow  3,301 1.0557 3.7650 -31.500 41.71 
Q Tobin's Q  3,143 1.4653 0.7663 .5061 5.62 
Table 2. Dynamic panel-data estimation two-step system GMM 
Risk Financial  Economic  Political  Composite 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  0.671*** 0.413*** 0.374*** 0.364*** 
 
(0.0860) (0.1030) (0.116) (0.112) 
  0.00320 0.009*** 0.0048*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0005) 
  -0.007** -0.0067** -0.0043*** -0.001** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0006) 
  -0.114*** -0.132*** -0.107*** -0.118*** 
 
(0.0322) (0.0410) (0.0375) (0.0392) 
  0.0124** 0.015*** 0.0149*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0058) 
  0.0063*** 0.006*** 0.0057*** 0.0055*** 
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  (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Observations 2,378 2,378 2,378 2,378 
Number of ID 241 241 241 241 
Instruments 38 44 60 60 
AR (1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AR (2)  0.1950 0.6250 0.7210 0.7340 
Hansen Test 0.1500 0.3520 0.4470 0.5330 
F (6.2410)  26.570 18.480 19.340 17.960 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Corrected standard errors in parentheses, The AR (2) tests for autocorrelation, and the Hansen 
test tests for over identification of instruments *** p<0.01 significant at 1% level, ** p<0.05 
significant at 5% level, * p<0.1 significant at 10% level.  is the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable.  Is risk score (financial, economic, political and composite risk).  
Change in risk,  leverage,  Tobin’s Q and  cash flow. 
 
Tables 2 shows the regression output of the dynamic models. Four different models for financial, 
economic, political and composite risks were estimated. The system GMM with orthogonal option 
(since we have unbalanced panel data) was used to estimate the models. The results provide evidence 
that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between investment and economic, financial 
and political risk ratings as shown by positive and significant coefficients. As given by the ICRG 
methodology, a higher rating implies lower risk. Hence, the positive relationship implies that a higher 
rating level (low risk) is associated with high investment. Thus, the increase in economic and political 
risk (model 2 and 3) lowers investment at firm level.  
Therefore, economic and political risk have a constraining effect on firm investment. The results are in 
line with the Behavioural theory that investors will reduce investment in countries with high political 
risk (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). The finding is consistent with Hayakawa et al. (2013), Kazunobu et 
al. (2011), who found a positive association between political risk and foreign direct investment in 
developing economies. The results also support Busse and Hefeker (2007) hypothesis that political 
risk is among the major determinant of investment. The coefficient of  under economic and 
political risk is negative and statistically significant, implying that not only the current level of 
economic and political risk is an important determinant of firm level investment but the change in risk 
rating over time significantly influences firm investment. Shocks in economic and political risks 
ratings have a significant adverse effect on firm discretionary investment.  
Regarding financial risk, the results indicates a positive association between the index score and firm 
investment, indicating a potential reduction in investment following an increase in risk. However, 
consistent with Kazunobu et al. (2011), the relationship is not statistically significant, implying that 
JSE listed firm’s investment levels are not too sensitive to financial risk levels of the country. Thus, 
South African firms do not consider financial risk in making their investment decisions. The 
coefficient for financial risk shock  is negative and statistically significant, implying that firm 
investment negatively correlates with changes in financial risk index score. The change in financial 
risk is more important than the level of financial risk in determining firm level investment in South 
Africa. For the composite index, the weighted average of political, financial and economic risk 
measuring the country risk, the results show that an increase in the composite country risk score (low 
risk) results in an increase in firm investment levels. The higher the risk rating the lower the potential 
country risk and the higher the investment. This finding is consistent with Giambona et al. (2017) who 
documents that 50 percent of  firms avoid investment in economies with high country risk. The 
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coefficient of country risk shock  is also negative and statistically significant, this implies that 
overall the change in country risk also has a significant negative impact on firm investment. Firms 
lower their investments levels following shocks in country risks.  
In consistent with dynamic stability, the lagged dependent variable coefficients  are less than one in 
all four models.  parameter is positive and statistically significant indicating that previous investment 
levels plays a significant role on the current level of investment of firms. The positive relationship 
between investment and the lagged investment imply that firms with high investment levels invest 
more in the subsequent periods, periods of higher investment are followed by periods of higher 
investment and periods of lower investment are followed by periods of lower investment indicating 
investment persistency in JSE listed firms. The rate of convergence given by 1-  , (  is the 
coefficient of   ) is almost 0.6 for the 3 models (economic, political and composite risk) indicating an 
average reflection on the impact of previous investment on current investment level. The lower 
coefficients indicate that the speed of adjustment is low. Consistent with Aivazian et al. (2005); Lang 
et al. (1996); Yuan and Motohashi (2014); Vengesai and Kwenda (2018) leverage was found to be 
negatively correlated with investment. This is consistent with the debt over hang hypothesis that 
leverage induces under-investment through the reduction in the incentive to take on profitable 
investment given that benefits accrue to bondholders rather than to shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990). The liquidity hypothesis argue that firms that are more committed to 
interest payments (high leverage) invest less regardless of their growth opportunities (Aivazian et al., 
2005).  
The availability of internal funds measured by cash flows is positively associated with investment, 
implying that firms that generate higher cash flows have high investment levels. The results indicate a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between firms’ level of investment and Tobin’s Q, 
this shows that growth opportunities are a significant determinant of firm investment. Firms with high 
growth opportunities have higher investment ratios. The GMM estimator is consistent in the absence 
of second order serial correlation in the residuals of the differenced equations. The Arellano-Bond AR 
(2) test was used to test for correlation. In all the equations Arellano-Bond, AR (2) test is more than 
five per cent, hence the absence of auto correlation null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Testing the 
legitimacy of instruments and model specification is crucial in dynamic panel data analysis, moment 
conditions must be tested for over-identification (Roodman, 2006). The Hansen/Sargan test of over 
identification restrictions were used. The Hansen tests are above five per cent for all four models 
providing evidence of correct identification of instruments and correct specification of the models.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Financial literature is crowded with empirical studies on the effects of political and financial risk on 
FDI and other aggregate variables such as GDP. No studies conducted to assess the impact of these 
risks at firm level. To close this gap and add to this scanty literature the present study examined the 
impact of country risk components (financial, political and economic risks) and risk shocks on 
investment at firm level for JSE listed firms. Using a dynamic panel model estimated with the system 
GMM, the study found that political, economic and overall country risky negatively impact investment 
at firm level. JSE listed firms reduce investment following an increase in economic, political and 
overall country risk. Regarding financial risk no significant relationship was found between financial 
risk and firm investment, implying that levels of financial risk do not significantly affect firm 
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investment in South African listed firms. The study also examined the effects of changes in risk 
ratings on firm investment. We found evidence that not only the levels of risks affect investment but 
the changes in risk from year to year have a negative impact on firm investment. For all the risk 
components the study found a negative relationship between risk changes and firm investment. The 
reduction in firm investment following an increase in country risk suggest that South African investors 
are more risk averse. Policy effort to reduce country risk and shocks to improve investment is 
therefore recommended.  
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